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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
Jennilue Crosby Larsen, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for five counts of theft of a firearm, all 
second degree felonies. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78 A-4-
103(2)(e) (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Should Defendant's five convictions for theft of a firearm have merged into a 
single conviction because the firearms were taken at the same time from the same 
place? 
Standard of Review. No standard of review applies to this issue because it was 
not preserved for appeal, and Defendant fails to argue any exception to the 
preservation requirement. See State v. Patrick, 2009 UT App 226, \ 11,217 P.3d 1150 
(an appellate court does not address arguments not preserved below), cert denied, 
225 P.3d 880 (Utah, Jan. 20, 2010). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
There are no determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with five counts of theft of a firearm, all second 
degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-404 (West 2010) and 76-6-
412(l)(a)(ii) (West Supp. 2011). R. 6-8. Each of the five guns was taken from the 
same place at the same time. R. 6-8. Following a one-day trial, a jury convicted her 
as charged. R. 91-95. The trial court sentenced Defendant to five concurrent 
sentences of one-to-five years in the state prison, suspended all but 30 days of the 
sentences, and placed her on thirty-six months probation. R. 205-07, 209, 214-18. 
Defendant timely appealed. R. 199-200. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Seventeen-year-old Ashley Crowley lived with her father Russell in loka, 
Utah. R. 231:98-99,106,109,137. On entering the house they shared on January 20, 
2009, Ashley immediately noticed that a closet door in the living room was standing 
open and the kitchen drawers visible from near the front door were open. R. 231:99-
100,102-04. Because she had been the last to leave the house that morning and was 
the first to return home, she believed that someone had been there while she was 
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gone. Id. Neither she nor her father noticed that anything was missing at that time. 
R. 231:104-05,112. However, as the two were getting ready to go hunting a couple 
of days later, they discovered that five guns were missing from Russell's bedroom. 
R. 231:100-02,105,112,135. Two of the guns belonged to Ashley and three belonged 
to her father. R. 231:100-02,105,112,130-32,134-35. They did not immediately 
report the missing guns to the police, however, because Russell believed that 
Defendant had them. R. 231:113,133. 
Russell Crowley had a "pretty serious" relationship with Defendant for 
"almost four years" before it ended in March of 2009. R. 231:109. Shortly before the 
guns were stolen, the two got into an argument because Russell missed a dinner 
date with her to go hunting with his friend and her ex-boyfriend Tim without telling 
her. R. 231:110-12. Approximately two weeks later, the guns were found missing. 
R. 231:113. 
A few days later, Russell and Defendant "were having a good evening" when 
he mentioned that he would "sure like to know where [the guns] were at." R. 
231:113-14. Defendant responded, "[Wjell, I've got them, because now you'll start 
spending time with me instead of Tim." R. 231:114. Russell saw the guns numerous 
times in Defendant's bedroom partially under a blanket by her bed and believed 
they were still there when their relationship ended in mid-March. R. 231:114-15, 
132-33,137-39. He did not take the guns back, however, because he hoped that she 
3 
would live up to her promise to give them back, thereby preventing further damage 
to their relationship. R. 231:11445. 
A major rift occurred in the relationship in mid-March when Russell arrived 
at Defendant's home unannounced and found another man with Defendant. R. 
231:115-16. The next day, Defendant sent Russell a text message saying, "Come get 
your guns/7 R. 231:115-20. Russell immediately headed to Defendant's home, only 
to get a phone call from her when he was halfway there. R. 231:120-21. During the 
heated conversation, she told him not to come or she would call the police. Id. 
Consequently, he did not go, and he never got his guns back. R. 231:121-22,222. He 
reported them stolen a day or two later. R. 231:133. 
Officer Delia Rowley investigated the reported theft. R. 231:139-41. As part of 
her investigation, she interviewed both victims and Defendant. R. 231:141,144. She 
also received a witness statement from Defendant stating that she did not have "any 
items that belong''' to Russell and claiming that he was harassing her son and her 
friends. R. 231:142. Officer Rowley obtained a search warrant for Defendant's 
home, but no guns were found. R. 231:146. 
Defendant was the sole witness for the defense. R. 231:3,149-212,231-34. She 
admitted sending Russell a text message telling him to come and get his guns, but 
denied ever having the guns, ever speaking to him about either the guns or the theft 
prior to March 16, ever inviting him to a dinner he missed because he went hunting, 
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and ever fighting with him about it. R. 231:153,162-64,167-69,193. Instead, she 
claimed that Russell was responsible for their break-up in March, that he harassed 
her, her son, and her mother, and that she sent him the text message telling him to 
come and get his guns because by agreeing with his claim that she had them she 
thought he would "go away" and leave [her] alone[.]" R. 231:159-63,165-66,201-04. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should decline to reach Defendant's claim that her five theft 
convictions should have merged into a single second-degree felony conviction. 
Defendant did not raise a merger claim in the trial court, and she fails to argue any 
exception to the preservation requirement in order to permit appellate review of her 
claim. Further, her assertion that the trial court sua sponte raised the issue lacks 
record support. Finally, her argument violates this Court's briefing requirements, 
permitting its summary rejection. 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT ARGUES NO BASIS UPON WHICH TO OBTAIN 
APPELLATE REVIEW OF HER UNPRESERVED MERGER 
ARGUMENT; FURTHER, THE ARGUMENT IS 
INADEQUATELY BRIEFED ON ITS MERITS, JUSTIFYING ITS 
REJECTION 
Defendant claims that the doctrine of merger applies in this case to bar her 
conviction for more than a single offense because all five guns were stolen at the 
same time from a single location. See Aplt. Br. at 3-4. This Court need not reach the 
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merits of her claim, however, because she failed to preserve it for appellate review. 
See State v. Prawitt, 2011 UT App 261, f 13,688 Utah Adv. Rep. 33. In any event, the 
claim does not warrant review because it is inadequately briefed. 
A. The Claim is Unpreserved 
" As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised 
on appeal/' State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11,10 P.3d 346. "'Utah courts require 
specific objections in order to bring all claimed errors to the trial court's attention to 
give the court an opportunity to correct the errors if appropriate.7" State v, Meza, 
2011 UT App 260, % 4,688 Utah Adv. Rep. 50 (quoting State v. Hardy, 2002 UT App 
244, % 14,54 P.3d 645 (internal quotation marks omitted)). To preserve an issue for 
appellate review, "'the issue must be sufficiently raised to a level of consciousness 
before the trial court and must be supported by evidence or relevant legal 
authority/" Prawitt, 2011 UT App 261,113 (quoting State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, \ 13, 
95 P.3d 276 (internal quotation marks omitted)). A defendant can preserve a merger 
issue in the trial court by objecting " 'either during trial, or following the conviction 
on a motion to vacate/ " State v. Wareham, 2006 UT App 327, % 28, 143 P.3d 302 
(quoting State v. Lopez, 2004 UT App 410, f 7, 103 P.3d 153) (additional citation 
omitted). 
Defendant contends that the merger issue "was raised sua sponte by the [trial] 
court[,]" thereby preserving it for direct appeal. Aplt. Br. at 1 (citing R. 231:13,108). 
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However, neither of the record citations she provides supports her preservation 
claim. The first citation involves the judge's pre-trial discussion with counsel about 
the jury instructions. R. 231:13. After establishing an acceptable phrasing of the 
intent requirement for the elements instructions, the judge asked counsel if they 
agreed with the giving of "five instructions on the same exact elements[,]" 
prompting the following exchange: 
[PROS] Your Honor, it doesn't matter to me. I separated 
them out for clarity. 
THE COURT: Oh, no. 
[PROS] I thought we did. 
THE COURT: [Defense counsel], what do you think about that? 
[PROS] Because I know [defense counsel] is also going to ask that 
the jury verdict forms be specific -





— to each gun as well. 
I'm okay with it. I think that's appropriate because you 
have independent charges. Now, this all is alleged to have 
happened on the same date? 
Same date, same time. 
And, you know, not to get down the road too far, but I 
suppose there would be an issue of merger as far as the 
sentencing in the matter is concerned. But that's a bridge 
we can cross when we get to it. Do you want me to give 
five instructions that are exactly the same or -
7 
[PROS} Well, they are not exactly the same because they each 
contain a different firearm that was stolen. There were five 
separate firearms stolen. 
THE COURT: Okay. Smith - okay. You are right. . .. 
R. 231:12-13. The judge raised the issue of merger during this exchange, but only in 
the context of sentencing, which is not how Defendant argues it on appeal. See Aplt. 
Br. at 3-4. Further, the judge explained that his merger concern was premature and, 
hence, did not address it further but presented it for later consideration. He did not 
raise the issue again. 
The mere mention of the possibility of a merger issue is not sufficient to 
preserve the issue for appeal. See State v. McDaniel, 2010 UT App 381, f f 3-4, 246 
P.3d 162. Also telling is the absence of any response by defense counsel to the 
judge's characterization of the five charges as "independent charges." R. 231:13. 
Finally, following presentation of all the evidence, Defendant's counsel approved 
the giving of five separate elements instructions without expressing any concern for 
merging them. R. 231: 226-30. 
Defendant also points to page 108 of the trial transcript as the second of two 
points at which the trial judge raised the merger issue. See Aplt. Br. at 1. However, 
no discussion or mention of merger appears on or around that page of the 
transcript. 
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Where the record does not reflect that the merger issue was timely raised 
below by either the parties or the district court, the issue was not preserved for 
appellate review. See State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, f 45,114 P.3d 551, reh'g denied 
(June 1,2005). Consequently, this Court should consider the issue only if it qualifies 
under an exception to the preservation requirement. See generally State ex rel. D. V., 
2011 UT App 241, t 9,687 Utah Adv. Rep. 35; see also State v. Cram, 2002 UT 37, f 4, 
46 P.3d 230 ("[T]he exceptions to the preservation rule ... include plain error, 
exceptional circumstances, [and] ineffective assistance of counsel/7) (citing Holgate, 
2000 UT 74, f 11). Because Defendant fails to argue on appeal that the issue may be 
addressed for the first time under any of the exceptions, this Court should decline to 
consider the merits of her merger claim. See State ex rel D. V., 2011 UT App 241, f 9 
(declining to consider the merits of D.V/s hearsay claims where they were not 
preserved in the trial court and D.V. failed to argue any exception to the 
preservation requirement on appeal). 
B. The Claim is Inadequately Briefed 
Moreover, the argument presented by Defendant is inadequately briefed. 
"'An issue is inadequately briefed when the overall analysis of the issue is so lacking 
as to shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing court/" See State v. 
Smith, 2010 UT App 231, If 3,238 P.3d 1103 (quoting State v. Sloan, 2003 UT App 170, 
^[13,72 P.3d 138). Appellate courts have routinely declined to review the merits of 
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claims so inadequately briefed as to require the court to bear the "burden of 
argument and research[.]" See West Jordan City v. Goodman, 2006 UT 27, ^ 29,135 
P.3d 874 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); State v. Green, 2005 UT 9, 
111, 108 P.3d 710; State v. Chrisman, 2011 UT App 189, If 7,257 P.3d 1083 (refusing to 
review claim where defendant failed to identify and apply appropriate law). 
Here, Defendant's claim is inadequately briefed because she fails to identify 
and apply the relevant statutory authority applicable to her merger claim. See Utah 
R. App. P. 24(a) (attached in Addendum A). She simply relies on a case more than 
one hundred years old and, based thereon, claims a right to merger of her five 
convictions to a single one. See Aplt. Br. at 3-4 (citing State v. Mickel, 23 Utah 507,65 
P. 484,485 (Utah 1901)). Her cursory treatment of that case wrongly implies that the 
case is on all fours with the present case. In Mickel, the defendant challenged the 
trial court's overruling of his demurrer to an indictment charging him with grand 
larceny for stealing twenty mares and three horses that were owned by different 
individuals but were taken from the same place. 65 P. at 483-85. Mickel claimed 
that the indictment improperly charged him with more than one offense. See id. at 
485. The appellate court disagreed, holding that, as written, Mickel was indicted on 
"but one larceny, one transaction/' Id. The court rejected Mickel's claim that 
inclusion of the names of the multiple owners or the numbers of mares and horses 
stolen charged multiple transactions. See id. 
10 
Here, the Information clearly charged five distinct crimes, each based on the 
theft of a different gun. R. 6-8. This is in keeping with the post-Mickel statutory 
scheme under which the present thefts were prosecuted. Utah law generally allows 
merger of multiple convictions under three circumstances: (1) through the 
"judicially crafted'' merger doctrine, which protects against "violations of 
constitutional double jeopardy protection" (State v. Smith, 2005 UT 57, ^ 7,122 P.3d 
615); (2) through the merger test set forth in State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, t 23,994 
P.2d 1243, which applies when a defendant has been convicted of both kidnapping 
and another crime in which detention was inherent (see generally State v. Lee, 2006 UT 
5, f f 27-31,128 P.3d 1179); and (3) through the statutory merger authorized by Utah 
Code Annotated § 76-1-402 (West 2004). Defendant makes no mention of these 
circumstances or of the statutory scheme governing theft prosecution, which scheme 
is determinative of her argument. Instead, she completely ignores section 76-1-402, 
which permits the State to charge a defendant with violating the same provision of 
the Utah Code multiple times, as was done here. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1) 
& (2) (attached in Addendum B). The statute's only restriction is that a single act in 
a single criminal episode can only be punished under one provision of the Utah 
Code. See Utah Code xAjin. § 76-1-402(1). The State made no such allegation in this 
case. 
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As a result of Defendant's cursory and inadequate argument, analyzing the 
merits of her claim would require this Court to bear the "burden of research and 
argument/' which it should refuse to do. See Smith, 2010 UT App 231, f 3. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm Defendant's convictions. 
Respectfully submitted October / 0 ,2011. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
KRIS C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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Utah R. App, P. 24. Briefs 
(a) Brief of the appellant The brief of the appellant shall contain under appro-
priate headings and in the order indicated: 
(a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency whose 
judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of the case 
on appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list should be set out on a 
separate page which appears immediately inside the cover. 
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page 
references. 
(a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with parallel 
citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to the pages of 
the brief where they are cited. 
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court. 
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: the 
standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and 
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial 
court; or 
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in 
the trial court. 
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations 
whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the 
appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part 
of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the provision shall 
be set forth in an addendum to the brief under paragraph (11) of this rule. 
(a)(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature 
of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A 
statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall follow. All 
statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be supported by 
citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule. 
(a)(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, 
shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made in the body of the 
brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading under which the argument is 
arranged. 
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of 
the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for re-
viewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, 
statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a fact finding must 
first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding. A party 
seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state the request ex-
plicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award. 
(a) (10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought. 
(a)(ll) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary 
under this paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the brief unless 
doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound sepa-
rately, the addendum shall contain a table of contents. The addendum shall con-
tain a copy of: 
(a) (11) (A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central im-
portance cited in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief; 
(a)(ll)(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals 
opinion; in all cases any court opinion of central importance to the appeal but not 
available to the court as part of a regularly published reporter service; and 
(a)(ll)(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the 
determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings of fact 
and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's oral 
decision, or the contract or document subject to construction. 
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the require-
ments of paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not include: 
(b)(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied 
with the statement of the appellant; or 
(b)(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of 
the appellant. The appellee may refer to the addendum of the appellant. 
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the appellee, 
and if the appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in reply to the 
response of the appellant to the issues presented by the cross-appeal. Reply briefs 
shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief. The 
content of the reply brief shall conform to the requirements of paragraphs (a)(2), 
(3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further briefs may be filed except with leave of the 
appellate court. 
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs and 
oral arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such designations 
as "appellant" and "appellee/7 It promotes clarity to use the designations used in 
the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the actual names of parties, or 
descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the injured person,' "the taxpayer," 
etc. 
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages of 
the original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any state-
ment of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to 
Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to pages of published depositions or transcripts 
shall identify the sequential number of the cover page of each volume as marked 
by the clerk on the bottom right corner and each separately numbered page(s) 
referred to within the deposition or transcript as marked by the transcriber. Ref-
erences to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers. If reference is made to 
evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, reference shall be made to 
the pages of the record at which the evidence was identified, offered, and re-
ceived or rejected. 
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall not 
exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages 
containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum containing 
statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by paragraph (a) 
of this rule. In cases involving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of this rule sets forth 
the length of briefs. 
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the party 
first filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant, unless the parties 
otherwise agree or the court otherwise orders. Each party shall be entitled to file 
two briefs. No brief shall exceed 50 pages, and no party's briefs shall in combina-
tion exceed 75 pages. 
(g)(1) The appellant shall file a Brief of Appellant, which shall present the issues 
raised in the appeal. 
(g)(2) The appellee shall then file one brief, entitled Brief of Appellee and 
Cross-Appellant, which shall respond to the issues raised in the Brief of Appellant 
and present the issues raised in the cross-appeal. 
(g)(3) The appellant shall then file one brief, entitled Reply Brief of Appellant and 
Brief of Cross-Appellee, which shall reply to the Brief of Appellee and respond to 
the Brief of Cross-xA*ppellant. 
(g)(4) The appellee may then file a Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant, which shall 
reply to the Brief of Cross-Appellee. 
(h) Permission for over length brief. While such motions are disfavored, the 
court for good cause shown may upon motion permit a party to file a brief that 
exceeds the limitations of this rule. The motion shall state with specificity the is-
sues to be briefed, the number of additional pages requested, and the good cause 
for granting the motion. A motion filed at least seven days before the date the 
brief is due or seeking five or fewer additional pages need not be accompanied by 
a copy of the brief. A motion filed less than seven days before the date the brief is 
due and seeking more than 5 additional pages shall be accompanied by a copy of 
the draft brief for in camera inspection. If the motion is granted, any responding 
party is entitled to an equal number of additional pages without further order of 
the court. Whether the motion is granted or denied, the draft brief will be de-
stroyed by the court. 
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases involving 
more than one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for purposes of 
the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and any appellant or 
appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of another. Parties may 
similarly join in reply briefs. 
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant author-
ities come to the attention of a party after that party's brief has been filed, or after 
oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise the clerk of the 
appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations. An original letter and nine 
copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original letter and seven copies 
shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a reference either to the page 
of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the citations pertain, but the letter 
shall state the reasons for the supplemental citations. The body of the letter must 
not exceed 350 words. Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing and 
shall be similarly limited. 
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, pre-
sented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free from 
burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in 
compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, 
and the court may assess attorney fees against the offending lawyer. 
Addendum B 
Addendum B 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-1-402 (West 2004) Separate offenses arising out of 
single criminal episode —Included offenses 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate 
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same act of a 
defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be 
punished in different ways under different provisions of this code, the act shall 
be punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal or conviction and 
sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution under any other such 
provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single criminal 
episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant shall 
not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the defendant 
is arraigned on the first information or indictment. 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged 
but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included offense. 
An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to 
establish the commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to 
commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an included 
offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of 
the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense. 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate court 
on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence to 
support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient evidence 
to support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact necessarily 
found every fact required for conviction of that included offense, the verdict or 
judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a judgment of 
conviction entered for the included offense, without necessity of a new trial, if 
such relief is sought by the defendant. 
